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Leadership is a hurrah word. Like democracy and efficiency it attracts widespread 
support; however, again as with democracy and efficiency, it cannot easily be taught. 
Its meaning can be different in different contexts and different circumstances. It is a 
term capable of various definitions and can be used to justify a wide variety of 
actions. All these general comments apply in both public administration and in 
management in other contexts, but this paper will consider its relevance in the public 
sector and, in particular, consider how it may be best appreciated in the British civil 
service in the early years of the twenty-first century. 
 
In discussions about leadership in the British civil service there has been 
continuity in the attitudes of politicians from the latter years of the Thatcher 
premiership into the years of the Blair premiership. This can be seen in the Next Steps 
report (Efficiency Unit, 1988). It said that many people had told the scrutiny that ‘too 
few senior civil servants showed the qualities of leadership which would be expected 
from top managers in organisations outside the Civil Service’ (Appendix B, para. 25). 
The report focused on some main problems which, it said, needed ‘Leadership, and 
commitment to change from Ministers and the Senior Civil Service if they are to be 
dealt with’ (para. 150). Indeed, ‘senior managers … must be prepared to show real 
qualities of leadership, the ability to back their judgment and to take and defend 
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unpopular decisions’ (para. 35). In more recent times the Modernising Government 
Report said ‘We must … move away from the risk-averse culture inherent in 
government’ (Prime Minister, 1999, para. 6(6)), and ‘remove unnecessary 
bureaucracy which prevents public servants from experimenting, innovating and 
delivering a better product’ (para. 6(7)). It stressed that ‘All this requires strong 
leadership from the top and from all public service managers’ (para. 6(40)). In fact, in 
the British political system, this requires much thought and preparation if the 
leadership expectations are to be accommodated and implemented. Public servants 
after all work in a political environment constrained by the requirements of 
democracy, primary amongst them being the need for accountability. 
 
Leadership in the British Civil Service in the past 
 
Traditionally, and as explained by Sir Ivor Jennings, the most essential characteristic 
of the British civil service ‘is the responsibility of the minister for every act done in 
his department’ (Jennings, 1936, 1959 edition, p. 499). Jennings also said ‘The act of 
every civil servant is by convention regarded as the act of his minister’ (Jennings, 
1933, 1952 edn., pp 189-90). Herbert Morrison put the position clearly when he wrote 
that ‘the Minister is responsible for every stamp stuck on an envelope’ (quoted in 
Marshall, 1989, p. 7). 
 
One of the consequences of this constitutional position is that the executive 
arrangements in British government are bureaucratic - that is, consistent with the 
characteristics of an ideal bureaucracy as outlined by Max Weber (Weber, 1947, pp 
329-36). There is a hierarchy of accountability from the most insignificant and lowly 
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civil servant through his superiors up to, eventually, the permanent secretary and from 
the permanent secretary to ministers who are answerable to Parliament and its 
committees. Then, not less frequently than once every five years, the Government is 
answerable to the people, at a general election. This is what is generally known as 
representative democracy. The system is, however, more complex than at first appears 
and, particularly in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, has led to 
increasingly complex arrangements to ensure that the accountability of officials is 
clear when they are engaged in implementing government policies. 
 
When Jennings was writing ministers were answerable to Parliament and its 
committees; officials did not personally defend their actions in Parliament, but they 
were defended there by ministers. In committees (such as the Estimates Committee 
and the Public Accounts Committees) ministers also defended the work of their 
departments, but often civil servants also appeared to account for their work. In the 
second half of the twentieth century the parliamentary system became increasingly 
complex, with the creation of specialist select committees. Progressively, it was 
recognised that officials should defend themselves when detailed matters of policy 
implementation were under consideration. Officials, after all, filled out the details of 
policy and they managed policies. Indeed, it was here that their expertise was in more 
demand; it was here that leadership opportunities were most evident; and ministers 
who held particular offices for only short periods were not normally as well informed 
about policy details as their permanent officials whose working lives were dedicated 
to public service. 
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Constitutional adjustments were therefore made in practice and re-
interpretations were accommodated. The ultimate sanction available to the Public 
Accounts Committee was to surcharge officials, but in practice this sanction was not 
used after 1919 (Brittan, 1964, p. 80). This did not mean, however, that Parliament, its 
select committees and other inquiries were ineffective. A specific example of how the 
system worked was illustrated by the Crichel Down case. In that situation officials 
were carrying out the government policy of encouraging the development of best 
farming practice through the creation of model farms. Difficulties arose when the new 
Conservative Government did not make its policies sufficiently clearly known to the 
officials, and when the enthusiastic application of that policy conflicted with the 
interests of particular farmers. Following a public inquiry, Mr Melford Stephenson, 
the Recorder for Rye, said that in the Crichel Down case, the civil servants ‘derived 
great satisfaction from the exercise of personal power which they were able to wield 
at the expense of somebody else’s pocket’. He declared that ‘There is a time … when 
the public administrator can become, if not drunk, unfit to be in charge of his personal 
power’ (quoted in Brown, 1955, p. 102). Just as there is often a fine line between 
policy and administration, there may also be a fine line between the display of 
leadership in public administration and exceeding powers which should be 
constrained by the political environment. 
 
There are constitutional, political and practical checks that restrain the abuse 
of powers, whether or not the motivation is to exercise leadership. Two of these 
checks are mentioned here. In 1970 Sir William Armstrong, the Head of the Home 
Civil Service, was questioned about his personal attitude to exercising the 
considerable power he had. In answer, he explained that for him being answerable to 
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oneself was the greatest taskmaster. He added: ‘I am accountable to my own ideal of a 
civil servant’ (quoted in Chapman, 1970, p. 141). A second example of a check on 
leadership by civil servants was given by R.W.L. Wilding, when in charge of the 
Management Group in the Civil Service Department. He gave his personal view of the 
professional ethic of the administrator. He said it was necessary to distinguish energy 
from commitment: ‘it is absolutely necessary to pursue today’s policy with energy; it 
is almost equally necessary in order to survive, to withhold from it the last ounce of 
commitment’ (Wilding, 1979, p. 184). 
 
Nevertheless there has been considerable scope for leadership to be exercised 
by civil servants: it is leadership, however, that is consistent with the constraints as 
well as with the opportunities of work in the civil service. One way in which civil 
servants have demonstrated leadership in the constitutional context is by the standards 
they set and by the quality of decisions they make. Edward Bridges, for example, was 
particularly sensitive to the expectations for fairness and justice in the decisions he 
made. He set high standards for himself and expected similarly high standards in 
others. A specific example of this was the memorandum he issued to all civil servants 
after the Crichel Down Inquiry reported. The issue of such a memorandum from the 
Head of the Civil Service was a rare event, but Bridges felt that it was consistent with 
the accountability he had as Head of the Civil Service. He emphasised the need for 
civil servants to constantly bear in mind that the citizen had a right to expect that his 
personal feelings, no less than his rights as an individual, would be sympathetically 
and fairly considered, and he quoted from the report of the inquiry chaired by Sir 
Warren Fisher into the irregularities revealed by the Francs case which said that ‘The 
public expects from Civil Servants a standard of integrity and conduct not only 
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inflexible but fastidious’. Bridges ended his memorandum by saying: ‘It will do no 
harm if each one of us goes over the ground himself, and makes sure there is nothing 
amiss’ (quoted in Chapman, 1988, p. 276). 
 
Edward Bridges achieved a position of leadership in the British civil service 
by his industry, his mastery of the art of (public) administration, by the high standards 
he set himself, and by being regarded by others as an example to be followed. So 
outstanding was his example, and so well established was his personal authority, that 
he could even call ministers in to tell them when they were behaving badly, as 
sometimes they were (Chapman, 1988, p. 307). The standard being set and the 
leadership roles being demonstrated were, however, not developed by training 
programmes or codes of conduct but by processes of socialisation and personal 
conduct. Sir John Winnifrith recalled Bridges’ influence and said of him that ‘There 
were no directions, very few written instructions, but the word passed – all the quicker 
because it was not written – and all concerned knew what they had to do and what 
was expected of them’ (Winnifrith,1970, p.15). 
 
The traditional approach to successful leadership in the British civil service 
looks in two directions. On the one hand, it relates to other civil servants who regard 
particular individuals as leaders because of their positions at the top of a hierarchy, 
combined with the esteem in which they are held by other officials. On the other 
hand, it relates to the wider context, the political and constitutional context, in which 
senior civil servants work. It is in this context that civil servants and ministers inter-
relate and develop criteria for recognising particular people as leaders. Ministers can 
recognise civil service leaders and civil servants can recognise ministerial leaders. 
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Rarely does an individual emerge with as much high regard as a leader as Edward 
Bridges. Indeed, so significant was his role that in 1954 he wrote what became the 
definitive statement on ministerial responsibility – written at the request of the prime 
minister but delivered in Parliament by the Home Secretary, Sir David Maxwell Fyfe 
(quoted in Chapman, 1988, p. 276).  
 
 
Ministers and Civil Servants: Partners in Leadership 
 
 
There is little doubt that civil servants in the past exercised considerable influence on 
public affairs, and in that sense could be regarded as having been ‘leaders’. Indeed, 
there is some impressive scholarship on the subject (see for example, Barberis, 1996; 
Chapman, 1984, 1988, 2004; O’Halpin, 1989; Theakston, 1999). However, the kind 
of ‘leadership’ these past public servants exercised was quite different from that 
expected today. As noted above, they did so with a strict understanding of the 
constitutional, political and practical limitations on their authority. In particular, 
‘administrative leadership’ was constrained by the fact that ministers exercised 
‘political leadership’, including over their departments. Seen from the other side of 
the minister-civil servant relationship, this is well illustrated by Herbert Morrison in 
his illuminating book, Government and Parliament (1954). He devotes a whole 
chapter to ‘Ministers and Civil Servants’ in which he outlines the relationship, 
delineating the various responsibilities of each party and concludes that: 
The relationship between Ministers and civil servants should be – and usually 
is – that of colleagues working together in a team, cooperative partners 
seeking to advance the public interest and the efficiency of the Department. … 
The partnership should be alive and virile, rival ideas and opinions should be 
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fairly considered, and the relationship of all should be one of mutual respect – 
on the understanding, of course, that the Minister’s decision is final and must 
be loyally and helpfully carried out, and that he requires efficient and 
energetic service (pp. 318-19). 
He emphasises throughout that the minister is in charge, that he takes the important 
decisions and that he is answerable publicly and in Parliament for everything that is 
done in the Department.  
 
 In essence, Morrison was describing a relationship which was one of 
partnership, but a partnership dictated by the requirements of accountability in a 
democracy. As Graham Wallas put it in 1908: 
The real ‘second chamber’, the real ‘constitutional check’ … is provided … by 
the existence of permanent civil service, appointed on a system independent of 
the opinion and desires of any politician …. English civil servants … have the 
right and duty of making their voice heard, without the necessity of making 
their will prevail (1908, 1920 edn, p. 257). 
Sir Warren Fisher, a real leader of the civil service, put it more clearly: 
As English politics gets increasingly Americanised, we shall find Ministers 
more and more inclined to do shady things – and the Civil Servants of that day 
will have to possess the courage to say to their political chiefs ‘That is a 
damned swindle, sir, and you can’t do it’… (quoted in O’Toole, 2006, p. 77) 
His view was that ‘The presentation of integrity, fearlessness, and independence of 
thought and utterance in their private communion with Ministers … is an essential 
principle in enlightened Government’ (Tomlin, 1931, p. 1268, para. 12). 
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Herbert Morrison would likely agree with these sentiments. More prosaically, 
however, he also emphasises the need in the relationship between ministers and civil 
servants for the proper minuting of decisions, a subject to which he devotes three 
pages. Minuting, he argues, is part of ‘the price for parliamentary democracy’ (p. 
316). ‘Decisions may well tend to be slower than in private business concerns where 
they can be well reached even without records by the man on the spot, or as a result of 
a quick telephone conversation’. However, Parliamentarians may ask questions or 
take other action in Parliament, querying or challenging any government department; 
therefore, ‘proper records must be kept so that it might be ascertained what decision 
was reached, why, and by whom’. Moreover: 
it is also desirable to have such records for departmental reasons: in case the 
Minister or his civil servants should forget what decision was reached; to 
encourage care and responsibility in reaching decisions; and so that everybody 
(including the Minister) is committed and responsibility cannot well be 
shifted, which is only fair to everyone concerned (pp. 315-16). 
 
 The 2004 Butler Report into intelligence gathering prior to the Iraq War 
provides ample evidence of why such considerations are important (Butler, 2004a). 
Lord Butler referred to the approaches adopted by the Blair administration as ‘sofa 
government’ (2004b). One of the main criticisms, indeed, was that the informal nature 
of decision making in relation to the Iraq war ‘made it much more difficult for 
members of the Cabinet outside the small circle directly involved to bring their 
political judgement and experience to bear on the major decisions for which the 
Cabinet as a whole must carry responsibility’. This, he argued, had ‘lessened the 
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support of the machinery of government for the collective responsibility of the 
Cabinet’ (Butler, 2004a, paras 609-610).  
 
These observations are, of course, directly related to the intelligence about the 
Iraq war; but Lord Butler was concerned with a more general situation in which 
decisions are confined to small groups of directly involved ministers and officials 
meeting informally and apparently without minute takers. He thought this inimical to 
collective decision making and to the effective coordination of government activities 
(Butler, 2004b). Such approaches seem to have evolved because the government 
believed that ‘business practices’ are more efficient for the dispatch of government 
activities. They sit easily with the ‘can-do’ approach adopted by Margaret Thatcher, a 
view of government as if it were indeed a business. The niceties of consultation, 
discussion, recording – all factors in the traditional style of public administration as 
described by Morrison, and all necessary for the political leadership of ministers – are 
apparently inimical to the efficiency of government. The relationship between 
ministers and civil servants has fundamentally changed. 
 
Nowhere is this more clearly evidenced than by Tony Blair himself in a 
speech he made about public service reform in 2004 to a ‘Civil Service Reform 
Event’ hosted by the then Head of the Civil Service, Sir Andrew Turnbull (Prime 
Minister, 2004). Surprisingly, the then Prime Minister’s first comments were in praise 
of the Northcote Trevelyan Report of 1854, a report that had encouraged the 
‘enduring values’ that had ‘underpinned’ the civil service. ‘Those values’, he said, ‘of 
integrity, impartiality and merit have proved timeless and are a decisive legacy of 
Gladstone and his officials’. He went on that the civil service ‘has strengths that are 
 10
priceless. The greatest is indeed its integrity’. Moreover, it is not just the ‘lofty ideals 
of integrity and political impartiality’ that are the hallmarks of the civil service. It has 
the ‘ability to master complex negotiations not just with attention to detail but sublime 
skill’, abilities which the Prime Minister had witnessed and ‘been grateful for’ on 
many occasions. The service ‘provides expert advice, intelligently crafted and usually 
utterly sensitive to political reality’. These are all sentiments which Morrison some 
sixty years ago would have wholeheartedly supported, and which sit easily with a 
view of the civil service as the supporters and advisers of ministers in their public 
duties.  
 
What follows, however, is a series of comments which reveal that Blair was 
totally out of sympathy with such a view, and his complete belief that the private 
sector is better than the public sector. This can be seen even in the apparent praise 
heaped upon civil servants, ‘the calibre’ of whom is ‘enormously high; in many 
respects every bit as good as their private sector counterparts’ (emphasis added). He 
argued that the challenge was to sustain the Gladstonian values he apparently lauded 
while bringing about ‘the radical transformation our times demand’ so that public 
services could meet ‘consumer expectations’. What he sought was the creation of an 
‘Enabling Government’, helping people to help themselves. Government would 
become ‘an instrument of empowerment’. The civil service was unresponsive to the 
increasing consumerism of society and its focus should shift from ‘policy advice’ (the 
very strength the Prime Minister referred to earlier in his speech) to ‘delivery’, by 
which he meant: 
Outcomes. It means project management. It means adapting to new situations 
and altering rules and practices accordingly. It means not working in 
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traditional departmental silos. It means working naturally with partners outside 
government. It’s not that many individual civil servants aren’t capable of this. 
It is that doing it requires a change of operation and of culture that goes to the 
core of the civil service. 
This is to be achieved ‘By changing the law; by innovating; by setting targets; by 
leadership; by focussing on results’. 
 
 The then Prime Minister recognised that one of the obstacles to the emergence 
of a new breed of civil servant, ‘more entrepreneurial, … more adventurous like their 
private sector counterparts’, is politicians themselves, who seek vast amounts of 
information and prevent civil servants from taking risks. Politicians, he argued, should 
be accountable, but ‘sometimes we can be so frightened by the process of 
accountability, we opt for inertia’. Nevertheless, the civil service and civil servants in 
the future should display the following characteristics, characteristics that had enabled 
many successful examples of policy initiatives: 
A sense of ambition, including crucially the belief that apparently intractable 
problems can be solved; a relentless focus on outcomes; clarity including the 
application of programme and project management techniques that have 
transformed business; urgency including finding out quickly what’s working 
and what isn’t and adapting accordingly; and finally seeing things through 
until change is irreversible.  
 
 In an accompanying document, published by the Cabinet Office, details 
emerged about how the Prime Minister’s vision was to come about. In essence, it 
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would depend on ‘visible leadership’ from the most senior officials in government 
(Cabinet Office, 2004, para. 5.2). 
 
Leadership in the Civil Service Now 
 
As noted in the introduction to this paper, leadership is a nebulous concept, which can 
mean different things to different people at different times. It is clear that what is 
meant by leadership now in the British civil service is not about traditional modes of 
encouragement, support and morale boosting – an almost military concept, befitting 
an institution which one of its great past leaders regarded as ‘the fourth service of the 
Crown’ (see O’Halpin, 1989; O’Toole, 2006, pp 74 – 79). It is rather about equipping 
civil servants for new roles, roles summarised in one word, ‘delivery’. This is 
encapsulated both in the Senior Civil Service Top Leadership Programme and in the 
most recent civil service reform initiative emanating from the Cabinet Office, or that 
part of it called the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, the so called ‘Capability Reviews’ 
(see Cabinet Office, 2006; Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, 2006a, 2006b and 2007; 
Horton, 2007). These reviews will apparently lead to a civil service which ‘is better at 
delivering public services’, one of the three aims being to ‘assure the public and 
ministers that the Civil Service leadership is equipped to develop and deliver 
departmental strategies’.  
 
‘Leadership’ is thus at the very centre of the reviews, the Cabinet Office 
raising ‘key questions that test current capability’, which essentially define what is 
meant by leadership for this purpose under four headings. Leadership is about setting 
direction, igniting passion, pace and drive, taking responsibility for leading delivery 
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and change, and building capacity’ (Cabinet Office, 2006).  Sir Gus O’Donnell, the 
current Head of the Civil Service, is in the vanguard of these processes, exercising the 
‘visible leadership’ referred to above. Indeed, no doubt in his capacity as the ‘leader’ 
of the civil service, he has set out ‘Gus’s Vision’ for the civil service, a vacuous 
statement reminiscent of a similar theme published by Sir Richard Wilson, one of 
O’Donnell’s predecessors as leader of the civil service, in a document entitled Vision 
and Values (Cabinet Office, 1999). Wilson’s vision was of a civil service that was the 
best at everything it does (para. 6). O’Donnell’s vision is ‘for a civil service that 
exudes pride, pace, passion and professionalism’ with core values of ‘honesty, 
objectivity, integrity and impartiality’, all of these elements of the vision bound 
together ‘in a diverse civil service’ (O’Donnell, 2006a). To reinforce the vision, the 
first ever civil service awards ceremony was held in November 2006, precisely to 
celebrate ‘the pride, pace, passion and professionalism demonstrated by teams and 
individuals … who have made a real difference to people’s lives’. In October 2006 
there were also the first ever civil service ‘Diversity and Equality Awards’.  
 
O’Donnell expanded on the themes of his ‘vision’ in a speech delivered to a 
Public Service Reform conference in June 2006, in which he said his objective was to 
create ‘a culture of excellence’, which would involve in practice ensuring that ‘the 
Civil Service is admired worldwide for the quality of its policy advice’. It would also 
‘deliver world class, customer focused services’ and be ‘relentlessly customer 
focused’. All this means ‘thinking in a new way’, and being ‘responsive and flexible’. 
These challenges require ‘the best talent at all levels’ and ‘excellent leadership at all 
levels ’. At the top, it is ‘no longer enough for senior leaders to be focussed on just 
their own areas’, they must ‘ensure that, within and between departments, leaders 
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focus on delivering final outcomes, not just their own, often intermediate targets’ 
(O’Donnell, 2006b). The capability reviews are essentially one component of the 
means by which O’Donnell’s ‘vision’ can be implemented, and thus far fifteen 
departmental capability reviews have been conducted, covering nearly 80 per cent of 
the civil service. 
 
 One of the core themes to have emerged from the reviews themselves is 
‘Leadership from the centre’ (see Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit, 2006a, pp 14 – 17; 
2006b, pp 7 – 8; 2007, pp 29 – 35). Indeed, leadership seems to be Theme 1, because 
‘great leadership is central to strengthening capability’ (2006b, p. 7). Leadership, 
however, seems largely to be a matter of what might be called corporate governance. 
This can be seen in the various measures that have been taken to strengthen the 
leadership capacity throughout the civil service, including, for example: implementing 
a ‘new leadership framework for the Senior Civil Service’, in which ‘All Senior Civil 
Service staff are assessed against common and challenging standards for leadership’; 
developing ‘a clear corporate role for the “top 200” leaders in the Civil Service’ (the 
cross civil service leadership group); and starting ‘to produce a comprehensive People 
Strategy for the Civil Service’ (2006b, p. 8). More widely, O’Donnell has set up 
‘streamlined governance arrangements for the Civil Service with a quarterly 
Permanent Secretaries Management Group meeting to discuss civil service wide 
issues’ and a smaller Civil Service steering Board, which addresses ‘key challenges’ 
identified by a series of sub-groups (Cabinet Office, 2006). The civil service has also 
launched ‘Leaders Unlimited’, a corporate development programme aimed at realising 
the management potential of women, black and minority ethnic staff, and staff with 
disabilities. 
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  Much of this is eminently laudable, especially since, rather than being about 
leadership it is more about equipping the civil service for the skills ministers now 
require of it. What they require are essentially technical skills, skills to be developed 
for the purpose of delivering public policies. This reflects complex changes in the way 
in which government is conducted in this country. In particular, there has been a 
downgrading of the civil service as part of the apparatus of policy making. Ministers 
no longer require the traditional skills for which senior civil servants had an excellent 
reputation, and which the civil service prior to the 1980s valued above all else (see 
O’Toole, 2006, chapter 5). The former Prime Minister’s assertions about the 
Gladstonian tradition, and the aspiration of the current Head of the Civil Service to 
make the civil service world class in this respect, are meaningless. The increasing 
reverence for business like methods, the ever present influence of special advisers and 
policy Czars, the exponential growth of think tanks, policy units, and other non-
government sources of advice, have combined to contribute to the marginalisation of 
civil servants in the policy process. It is not leadership that is being developed in the 
civil service, it is what might be labelled ‘public entrepreneurship’. The skills required 
are risk taking, ambition, focus on outcomes, and all the other attributes associated 
with business ventures. The changes being wrought in consequence of the Capability 
Reviews and the wider efficiency strategy and civil service reform programme are 
designed to create the conditions in which this can come about. The irony is that the 
measures being taken, especially the corporate governance changes, are more likely to 
be stifling to the development of such skills. 
 
 
 16
 Leadership in the British Civil Service: an Interpretation 
 
The Public Administration Select Committee’s latest report is essentially about the 
Capability Reviews. The Committee’s analysis is that all departments of government 
are not ‘fit for purpose’, to use the ugly phrase that has acquired currency  recently 
(Public Administration Select Committee, 2007, para.27). Part of this they attribute to 
a lack of leadership, citing a recent survey of the Senior Civil Service indicating that 
more than half felt their ‘top team’ not to be providing effective leadership (para. 29). 
‘Confident leadership’, the Committee asserts, ‘is needed to allow civil servants to 
carry out their constitutional duty to tell truth to power’ (para. 30). This exhortation 
has come too late. The trouble with the Committee’s analysis is that the purpose of the 
civil service has shifted – Fisher, Bridges and their colleagues did ‘speak truth unto 
power’, and they did so because that was how they saw their constitutional duty. More 
importantly, it was how those in positions of political power saw their duty. This was 
part of the remit of senior officials as policy advisers in what used to be called the 
higher civil service. As senior officials have been marginalised so it is not surprising 
that leadership of this sort has declined. The Public Administration Select Committee 
is living in the past if it really thinks that the traditional role of senior officials has 
survived. The problem is, and this is identified, if accidentally, by the Committee 
itself, that the civil service is not now really capable of becoming what ministers (and 
apparently the Committee itself) want it to be. In the process of change the civil 
service has become, in the phrase Alexander Pope used to describe the advisers to the 
monarch in his time, an ‘amphibious thing’: 
Whether in florid impotence he speaks 
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And, as the prompter speaks the puppet squeaks 
… 
Amphibious thing! that acting either part, 
The trifling head or the corrupted heart 
Fop at the toilet, flatt’rer at the board 
Now trips a lady, and now struts a Lord 
(Pope, 1734, 1933 edn, p. 125) 
Pope was referring in this passage to John, Lord Hervey, a vice chamberlain at the 
Court of George II, and confidential adviser to Queen Caroline. Sporus, the 
pseudonym Pope used to protect himself,  was a eunuch acolyte of the Emperor Nero. 
The civil service of the present time has suffered the same fate as that of poor Sporus: 
it has been neutered. The call from the Public Administration Committee for the 
equivalent of a National Audit Office to investigate civil service performance is quite 
irrelevant in this context (Public Administration Select Committee, 2007, para. 127). 
 
There are superficial signs that the new administration led by Gordon Brown 
might be inclined to a more traditional view of the relationship between minsters and 
their officials. For example, one of Brown’s first acts as Prime Minister was to 
withdraw the 1997 Order in Council that gave management powers to a limited 
number of special advisers (Prime Minister, 2007, col. 817). This symbolic act seems 
to have been reinforced by the reluctance of new ministers to make important 
announcements except in Parliament. Gordon Brown himself devoted his first major 
speech in Parliament to constitutional reform, and emphasised in particular 
reinforcing the neutrality of the civil service and removing from the discretion of the 
executive the core values governing it (Prime Minister, 2007, col. 817). This may 
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even take the form of a Civil Service Act, long called for by the Public Administration 
Select Committee and the Committee on Standards in Public Life (for further 
discussion, see O’Toole, 2006, pp 175 - 80). This will be in addition to significant 
changes in The Ministerial Code (Cabinet Office, 2007). These changes together 
could mark a shift in the way leadership is regarded under the new government. It 
may even be that the idea of ministerial responsibility seems to have re-emerged as 
one of the fundamental mechanisms by which government is managed.  
 
It is also the case, however, that the new Prime Minister has indicated his 
commitment to public service reform, continuing the processes begun by his 
predecessor. It may be, indeed, that the qualities sought in civil servants to deliver 
reforms will be exactly as previously expected – and, as indicated in the 1988 Next 
Steps report and subsequently, that they should display ‘real qualities of leadership’ 
and ‘take and defend unpopular decisions’. They should be risk takers, adventurers, 
public entrepreneurs. In other words, in the period since the Next Steps report, the 
administrative culture may have changed in ways which could render meaningless the 
intentions of the formal changes proposed by the Brown Ministry. Ministers are in 
charge, but there is no counterweight from the civil service. The leadership 
partnership has gone. Leadership in the civil service, as properly understood, is 
irrelevant. 
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